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Figure 1: Fertility, gender earnings gap and female labour force participation in OECD
countries
1 Introduction
Many developed countries have seen fertility levels fall far below replacement levels. At the
same time, female labour force participation is low in many of the same countries. This
puzzle has caught the attention of researchers (e.g. Ahn and Mira, 2002). Historically,
industrialisation and income growth have led to rising female labour force participation
and falling fertility rates in most developed countries. However, across developed countries,
the correlation between fertility and female labour force participation has recently turned
positive. Figure 1a shows the correlation between the total fertility rate and the female
employment ratein OECD countries.1 The ﬁgure clearly shows that countries with high
female labour force participation have higher fertility.
The status of women in the labour market is inﬂuenced, however, not only by their
participation but also by their earnings. There has been much discussion about gender
earnings gaps (see e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2007). Figure 1b shows the correlation between
the (full-time) gender earnings gap and female labour force participation. While there is
no signiﬁcant correlation between the two variables, the ﬁgure shows that there are some
countries (e.g. Sweden and Denmark) with notably high female labour force participatio-
nand low earnings gaps and others (such as Germany and Austria) with low female labour
force participationand high earnings gaps. Further, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) show
1Here and in the other ﬁgures below, all variables have been purged of the inﬂuence of a dummy for
being a formerly communist country and of continent dummies.
1that the gender wage gap is negatively correlated with the gender employment gap in a
smaller sample of countries in 1999.
These correlations open up the possibility that policies might increase both fertility and
female labour force participation and reduce the wage gap at the same time. The provision
of childcare is one measure which could enhance the compatibility of (female) work and
family. The availability of childcare makes it easier for women with children to work while
raising their children, and this may induce couples where the woman wants to work to
have more children. Hence, some governments have increased their eﬀorts for provision
of childcare. For instance, the German government, in its recent initiative to boost the
availability of childcare facilities for children under three, cited the Scandinavian standards
– high childcare enrolment, fertility and female labour force participation– as a reason for
aiming at providing 35% of all children under three with a childcare slot (BMFSFJ, 2008,
p.5).
Figure 2a shows the correlation between the total fertility rate and childcare spending
as a share of GDP in OECD countries. The same correlation holds between fertility and
enrollment in childcare institutions of children under 3 years.2 It is apparent from the
Figure that countries with high spending on childcare and high enrollment rates also have
high fertility.
Figure 2b shows the correlation between the female labour participation rate and child-
care spending as a share of GDP (again, the same correlation holds between female labour
participation and enrollment in childcare). As the ﬁgure shows, there is a clear positive
association between these two variables as well.
Figure 2c shows the correlation between the gender pay gap and childcare spending as
a share of GDP. It appears that the pay gap is negatively related to childcare spending
(although again this correlation is not signiﬁcant).3
Of course, correlation does not imply causality, and indeed, the aim of this paper
is to explain the joint determination of childcare as well as fertility, female labour force
participation and the wage gap. The argument will be that countries where society has a
2Note that this correlation breaks down when one considers enrolment of children aged 3-5. In this age
group, there is much less variability, as half the OECD countries have enrolment rates over 80%.
3Note that this ﬁgure refers to the raw gap in median earnings for full-time workers. It is not adjusted
for diﬀerences in education, labour market experience, occupation, etc. However, adjusting for these
measures would not necessarily be useful for current purposes, since some of these variables are themselves
endogenous and inﬂuenced by the availability of childcare. For instance, it might be that increasing
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Figure 2: Fertility, female labour force participation gender earnings gap and childcare
spending in OECD countries
3positive attitude towards working mothers or about the desirability of external childcare
for children will provide more childcare, which in turn increases fertility and female labour
force participation and reduces the wage gap.
In order to do so, in section 3, I will present some evidence to empirically corrobo-
rate that there is in fact a correlation between cultural attitudes, fertility, female labour
force participation and the wage gap. It is instructive to consider the cases of France
and Germany as examples. As is well known, the total fertility rate is much higher in
France, 2.0 in 2008 compared to only 1.38 in Germany. The maternal employment rate
was 72.8% in 2007 in France and 68.1% in Germany. Childcare arrangements also diﬀer
widely between the countries. In France, 42.9% of children under 3 years were enrolled in
childcare, compared to 13.6% in Germany. The gender earnings gap was 12% in France
and 23% in Germany.4 The argument in this paper is that these diﬀerences are (at least
partly) driven by diﬀerences in cultural attitudes. In Germany, 48.6% of all individuals in
2002 agreed with the statement “A pre-school child is likely to suﬀer if his or her mother
works”. In France, the corresponding ﬁgure was 42.5%.5 For women, the corresponding
numbers are 50.7% for Germany and 36.6% for France. Thus, cultural attitudes diﬀer
in a way that seems to go conform with diﬀerences in childcare provision, female labour
supply, fertility and the gender pay gap. In fact, in Germany, for a long time, mothers with
small children who worked would be called raven mothers (‘Rabenm¨ utter’), since working
while the children were cared for by someone else was seen as neglect of one’s children. In
France, the attitude towards working mothers has been much more positive, and women
often return to work shortly after giving birth (Fagnani, 2002).6 In this respect, however,
even Germany looks more like two countries, East and West. In 2008, 12% of all children
under three in West Germany were enrolled in external childcare, compared to 41.3% in
East Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010a). In 2002, the corresponding ﬁgures had
been 37% in the East and only 3% in West Germany. The gender wage gap was 24% in
West Germany in 2006 and only 6% in East Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010b).
The female labour force participation has been higher in East than in West Germany. In
2006, the female employment rate was 72.1% in East Germany, compared to 65.5 in the
West.7 The fertility rate in East Germany was higher than in the West until reuniﬁcation,
4Data are from OECD (2010).
5Data are from International Social Survey Programme.
6See also an article by Henkel (2003) in the German newspaper S uddeutsche Zeitung from whom the
title of this paper was borrowed.
7See Bundesagentur f¨ ur Arbeit (2007). In recent years there has been some convergence in female
4approximately 1.6 compared to 1.3, (see Kr¨ ohnert, 2010), when it took a plunge, prob-
ably due to rising unemployment and economic uncertainty. Correspondingly, the share
of individuals who agreed that a pre-school child with working mother is likely to suﬀer
was only 32.7% in East Germany (28% for women), compared to 55.8% in the West. In
an econometric analysis, Bauernschuster and Rainer (2010) show that no only are these
diﬀerences in gender-role attitudes within Germany large, they have actually grown over
time.8
In section 4, I present a model which formalises the interaction of cultural attitudes,
childcare provision, fertility and female labour supply. In the model, couples decide on
fertility and female labour supply, and whether to use publicly provided childcare or care
for the children at home. External childcare reduces the time input necessary to rear
children which increases fertility and labour supply and decreases the gender wage gap. The
supply of public childcare is ﬁnanced by income taxes and determined by majority voting.
There are two crucial assumptions about the perceived quality of external childcare: ﬁrst
perceived quality diﬀers between couples, depending on their cultural values, and second,
it is a positive function of the number of families who use childcare. This externality
gives rise to multiple equilibria: if everyone believes that childcare usage will be zero, the
provision of childcare will be zero, which leads to zero usage ex post. Fertility and female
labour supply will be correspondingly low and the wage gap high. Conversely, if voters
expect childcare usage to be high, they vote for high provision, which leads to high usage
ex post. Fertility and female labour supply will then be high and the wage gap low. In the
high-childcare equilibrium, childcare provision, fertility and female labour supply all rise
with the average societal attitude towars working mothers and the wage gap falls with the
average attitude.
In Section 5, I present a numerical example which can generate reasonable predictions
and also shows the sensitivity of the results to parameter variations. Section 6 extends the
model by considering the evolution of key variables over time, assuming that values are
either inherited from one’s parents, or that values evolve by a combination of inheritance
and learning.9 It is shown that, starting from a zero childcare equilibrium, nothing changes
employment rates.
8Note that in other countries of the former Soviet bloc, the percentages agreeing that a pre-school child
with a working mother was likely to suﬀer were much higher, over 60% for instance in Hungary, Bulgaria
and Russia.
9See Farr´ e and Vella (2007) and and Blau et al. (2008) for evidence on the intergenerational transmission
of values.
5over time, while starting from a positive childcare equilibrium, over time childcare usage
converges to one. The last section concludes.
2 Related Literature
There are several related strands of literature, both theoretical and empirical. There is
a large literature on childcare, female labour supply and fertility. Much of this literature
has examined the link between childcare provision and fertility and female labour supply.
Most papers have found positive eﬀects of childcare on both fertility and labour supply.
The present paper tries to formally analyse this link in a simple model. An early formal
model was presented by Ermisch (1989). See also Bick (2010) and Haan and Wrohlich
(2009) for simulation models that jointly determine fertility and female labour supply as a
function of childcare provision. However, these models have exogenous childcare provision
and abstract from cultural attitudes.
Kimura and Yasui (2009) analyse a model of voting on public education – which, con-
trary to childcare, is mandatory – with private supplements and endogenous fertility which
also produces multiple equlibria. However, their model is based on a time consistency mech-
anism: since households must decide on fertility before decisions on public education are
made, low fertility-low public provision equilibria and high fertility-high public provision
equilibria may coexist. In fact, if the timing in their model is changed, the equilibrium mul-
tiplicity disappears. By contrast, in the present model, multiple equilibria arise from the
interaction of individual beliefs and aggregate childcare choices even in the absence of time
inconsistency. Furthermore, Kimura and Yasui (2009) assume that women’s labour supply
falls inversely with the number of children. Since education is provided to all families, this
implies that fertility and female labour supply are (mechanically) negatively related, while
in this paper, in equilibrium they are positively related. Lastly, there is no wage gap in
their model.
Yasuoka and Miyake (2010) also analyse a model with endogenous fertility and labour
supply. They also ﬁnd multiple equilibria characterised by either high fertility and fe-
male labour supply or low fertility and female labour supply. However, in contrast to the
present paper, their model has no cultural values and childcare policies are exogenous. The
multiplicity of equilibria is due to the presence of endogenous growth.
6Baudin (2010) studies a model of cultural transmission in fertility decisions, focussing
on how this can generate a fertility transition. In the model, parents transmit their culture
to their children, where culture is interpreted as a fertility norm. Productivity shocks in
favour of low fertility individuals can generate a transition to a low-fertility state. However,
in contrast to the present paper, Baudin (2010) does not focus on the interaction of norms
and policies. He also does not endogenise labour supply. By contrast, Hiller (2009) analyses
a model where cultural norms are endogenous and in turn inﬂuence education and female
labour supply. However, he takes fertility as exogenous and focuses on the dynamics of
norms and female labour supply, rather than on the joint determination of policies and
labour supply.
Fernandez (2007a) and Fogli and Veldkamp (2009) study the evolution of female labor
force participation, where beliefs about the eﬀect of working are formed by observing other
women. Their focus, however, is on the propagation of beliefs for exogenous policies. In-
stead, this paper focuses on the endogenous determination of policy and on the interaction
of policies and beliefs or cultural attitudes.
There is a large literature on the gender pay gap which aims to explain why women earn
less than men. One important line of argument is that because of career interruptions and
shorter accumulated working experience due to childbirth, women have fewer incentives to
invest in human capital which implies lower lifetime wages (Mincer and Polachek, 1974).
For instance, Blau and Kahn (1997) found that about one third of the wage gap in their
sample could be explained by women working fewer hours. Waldfogel (1988) ﬁnds that
children lower women’s wages even controlling for labor market experience, perhaps because
having children in the past severs the ties between women and their employers, thereby
destroying returns to ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital. Erosa et al. (2010) present a quantitative
model of the gender wage gap. They assume that childbirth involves a forced reduction
of working hours. This leads to lower human capital accumulation by females, which
generates the wage gap. The present model includes a similar mechanism to determine the
wage gap. However, the reduction of hours is partly endogenous since it depends on the
choice of childcare.
Fernandez and Fogli (2009) empirically examine the eﬀect of cultural values on fertility
and labour supply using second-generation immigrants in the U.S. and ﬁnd that culture
matters for both. Their measures of culture are female labour supply or fertility in the
country of the immigrant’s parents lagged 50 years. Fernandez (2007b) presents a simi-
7lar exercise, using immigrants’ country of origin cultural values. van Gameren and Ooms
(2009) study childcare usage and labour force participation by mothers with pre-school
children in the Netherlands. They show that attitudes and opinions are important. See
also Fortin (2005, 2009). Farr´ e and Vella (2007) and Blau et al. (2008) study the intergen-
erational transmission of cultural attitudes and ﬁnd that this can explain female labour
force decisions. See also Fernandez et al. (2004). Fortin (2006) studies the inﬂuence of
gender attitudes on the gender wage gap empirically and ﬁnds that these values do inﬂu-
ence the wage gap. Thus this empirical literature provides clear evidence that there exists
a cultural inﬂuence on fertility and female labour supply. The present paper shows how
this can be rationalised by studying parents’ decisions about labour supply, fertility and
childcare.
More generally, there is a growing literature which studies cultural inﬂuences on eco-
nomic outcomes. For recent overviews, see Guiso et al. (2006) and Fernandez (2010).
3 Evidence
I now present some descriptive evidence on the link between cultural attitudes towards
female work and childcare and fertility and female labour supply decisions. The cultural
attitude variables are taken from answers to diﬀerent questions asked to individuals from
diﬀerent countries in the International Social Survey Programme. For each question I
regress the answer to the question on gender, age, age squared, a catholic dummy, and
set of country dummies. For each country, I then take the country ﬁxed eﬀect from that
regression as the country’s cultural attitude.
Figure 3a shows the correlation of the total fertility rate in OECD countries with the
average disagreement with the statement:10 “A pre-school child is likely to suﬀer if his or
her mother works.” Figure 3b shows the correlation of fertility with disagreement with the
statement: “A man’s job is to earn money, a woman’s job is to look after the home and
family.” As the Figures show, fertility rises with the disagreement with these statements.
Figures 4a and 4b show the correlation of female labour force participation with the
measures above. When the population tends to agree that pre-school children with a
working mother suﬀer, or that women should look after the home and family, female
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Figure 4: Female employment rate and cultural attitudes in OECD countries in OECD
countries
labour force participation tends to be low.
Figures 5a and 5b show the correlation between the wage gap and the measures above.
Again, when the population tends to agree that pre-school children with a working mother
suﬀer, or that women should look after the home and family, the wage gap is high (the
latter correlation is, however, insigniﬁcant).
As we have seen above, childcare spending is positively correlated with fertility and
female labour force participation, so it is no surprise that childcare spending is corre-
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Figure 5: Gender earnings gap, childcare spending and cultural attitudes in OECD coun-
tries in OECD countries
Of course, this evidence was purely descriptive with no claim of causality. In fact,
according to the model presented below, the perception of childcare quality depends on
childcare spending and enrolment. Hence, attitudes might well be endogenous. So the
whole point of this descriptive evidence is to show that cultural beliefs or attitudes are
correlated with fertility and female labour supply decisions. In particular, it seems that
fertility and female labour supply as well as the gender wage gap are aﬀected by society’s
attitudes towards working women or working mothers. The evidence discussed in section 2
further corroborates such a link. In the next section, I present a model which can generate
the correlations described heretofore.
4 The model
4.1 The economy
I consider an economy populated by couples who have to make three private decisions: how
many children to have, whether to send their children to an external childcare institution
and how much the woman should work. Moreover, society has to decide on how much
childcare to provide.
The couple’s utility is given by
u = alogc + blog(nQJ) + (1   a   b)logL, J 2 fC,Ng (1)
10where c is consumption, n the number of children and L leisure. Q is the quality of
childcare, which depends on childcare usage; the subscript C stands for ‘childcare’ and
subscript N for ’no childcare’, i.e. children are reared at home.
The couple’s budget constraint is
cJ = (1   τ)(wm + wfJℓJ), J 2 fC,Ng (2)
where wm is the man’s wage, ℓ is the woman’s labour supply depending on childcare usage
and wfJ the woman’s wage, which also depends on childcare usage (see below). For now, I
assume that childcare is ﬁnanced by taxes and provided free of charge to all those who use it.
In Section 5, where the model is solved numerically, I present an extension which allows for
partially subsidised childcare fees. All men are assumed to work full-time. Couples diﬀer
in their cultural attitude towards external childcare, captured by the parameter β (see
below), and by the male wage (because of assortative matching, I assume that the female
wage is proportional to the male wage). I will assume that β and wm are independently
distributed with (marginal) distribution functions given by F(β) for β 2 B and G(wm)
for wm 2 W.11 The mean wage is denoted by ¯ wm =
∫
wm∈W wmdG(wm). The distribution
of β is assumed to be symmetric with mean and median equal to βM =
∫
∈B βdF(β).
Population size is normalised to one.
Women’s labour supply depends on the take-up of childcare. I assume that raising
children takes women’s time. Letting subscript C refer to the case where children are in
childcare and N when they are not, the time constraints in the two cases are
LJ = 1   ℓJ   ΘJ   θJnJ, J 2 fC,Ng (3)
Here ΘJ,J 2 fC,Ng is a ﬁxed requirement for raising children and θJ the variable time
requirement per child. I will assume that ΘC < ΘN,θC < θN, so that raising children takes
less of the woman’s time when they are in childcare.
Couples have to decide on fertility, female labour supply and childcare. Due to the
assumption on the utility function, fertility and labour supply are independent of childcare
quality, conditional on childcare usage. (Since childcare quality aﬀects childcare usage,
however, the total fertility rate will be aﬀected by childcare quality.) Maximising utility
11It will be shown below that wage heterogeneity plays no major role in the model (due to the assumption
of Cobb-Douglas preferences) and, hence, this assumption is inconsequential.




b(wm + (1   ΘJ)wfJ)
θJwfJ




a(1   ΘJ)wfJ   (1   a)wm
wfJ
J 2 fC,Ng (5)
Fertility is increasing in full income wm+(1 ΘJ)wfJ. Since consumption, children and
leisure are all normal goods, higher full income increases fertility, leisure and consumption
and hence also labour supply. Fertility is also decreasing in the “price of children”, θJwfJ,
and female labour supply is increasing in the price of leisure, wfJ.12
I assume that the female wage is given by wfJ = (1   ΘJ)wm. This embodies two
assumptions: ﬁrst, due to assortative matching, female wages are proportional to male
wages. Second, childbirth is associated with absence from work which reduces women’s
human capital and hence their wage.13 This depreciation of human capital gives rise to a
wage gap (deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the male and female wage, as a percentage of
the male wage) equal to ΘJ, which depends on childcare usage. I will denote the equilibrium
wage gap by ω =
 wm−  wf
 wm , where ¯ wf = ¯ wm((1 H)(1 ΘN)+H(1 ΘC)) is the equilibrium
female wage, which depends on the fraction of couples using childcare, H.




b(1 + (1   ΘJ)2)
θJ(1   ΘJ)




a(1   ΘJ)2   (1   a)
(1   ΘJ)
J 2 fC,Ng (7)
Equation (6) shows that fertility is decreasing in θJ (this is the price eﬀect discussed
above). Since female wages are proportional to male wages, neither fertility nor labour
supply depend on the wage, which simply reﬂects the fact that with Cobb-Douglas utility,
income and substitution eﬀects of higher wages just cancel out.14 If one were to drop the
assumption of proportionality between male and female wages, one would ﬁnd that couples
with higher female wages have fewer children (see above). This would not, however, change
12Note that J aﬀects the price of children, but not the price of leisure.
13See the classic work by Mincer and Polachek (1974) and, more recently, Erosa et al. (2010).
14The couple’s full income is wm(1 + (1   ΘJ)2) and the price of children wm(1   ΘJ). So both income
and price of children increase proportionately with wm, and under Cobb-Douglas utility, the income and
substitution eﬀects are both one in absolute value.
12the main results of the paper in any fundamental way.
The eﬀect of ΘJ is composed of a direct eﬀect, which lowers full income and hence
decreases fertility and labour supply, and an indirect eﬀect through the reduced female
wage. This indirect eﬀect further reduces labour supply, but it increases fertility since the
price of children falls with a falling wage. So female labour supply surely increases with a
fall in ΘJ. However, the combined eﬀect of the direct and indirect eﬀect is that fertility
is decreasing in θJ and increasing in ΘJ. In the following, I will assume that the eﬀect
of θ dominates the eﬀect of Θ so that fertility is higher under usage of external childcare
than if children are raised at home. In the numerical model below (Section 5), it can be
shown that for the parameters of b,θC,θN and ΘN chosen, this assumption holds for all
0  ΘC  1.
4.2 Equilibrium with exogenous policy
The quality of childcare is normalised to one if the child is raised at home, QN = 1. If the
child is in childcare, the perceived quality of childcare is assumed to be QC = βHg, where
β is a couple-speciﬁc factor (the ‘cultural attitude’ towards childcare), H is the fraction
of children in childcare and g is level of childcare service per child, which equals spending
per child, adjusted for possible crowding (see Section 4.3 below). The quality of childcare
is perceived to be higher, the more is spent on each child. Moreover, the perceived quality
of childcare is assumed to depend on the couple-speciﬁc factor β and on the fraction of
children in childcare H.
Note that in principle, β could take on any value on the real line, so there is no a priori
restriction on the relationship between QC and QN. For instance, even if the quality of
external care is much larger than one, some low β parents may nonetheless choose to rear
their children at home, and conversely, high-β parents may want to use childcare even if
QC < QN. This couple speciﬁc attitude is assumed to be heterogeneous. For concreteness,
I will assume that it follows a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2 so the




where Φ() is the CDF of the standard normal
distribution. In addition to this individual factor, all couples perceive childcare to be more
beneﬁcial for their child the more children already use childcare, where α is a measure of
the strength of this externality. This externality is essential to generate multiple equilibria.
The reasoning behind this assumption is that if childcare usage is high, either couples learn
from observing others that childcare is not detrimental to their child, or the social stigma
13associated to putting children in daycare is lower.15
The childcare decision depends on the indirect utility in the case of childcare relative
to the indirect utility in the case the children are raised at home. Let VJ(),J 2 fC,Ng
denote indirect utility as a function of whether or not the children are in childcare. Using
(4) and (5) and simplifying yields
VJ() = aloga + blogb + (1   a   b)log(1   a   b) + alogwm
+ log(1 + (1   ΘJ)
2)   (1   a)log(1   ΘJ)   blogθJ
+ alog(1   τ) + 1b(logβ + logg + αlogH)
(8)
Here, 1 is an indicator function which is equal to one if J = C and zero otherwise.
The couple will send their children to childcare if and only if VC() > VN(). Using (8)
to solve VC() = VN() for β gives the following result.
Proposition 1 The fraction of families who use childcare, 1   F(ˆ β), is implicitly deﬁned
by










1 + (1   ΘN)2




Since utility is Cobb-Douglas, the childcare choice is independent of the wage. Obvi-
ously, the cutoﬀ value ˆ β is falling with the level of childcare service g. A higher service level
increases the quality of external childcare, which will lead to more couples using childcare.
While individual fertility and labour supply choices are unaﬀected by childcare provision
(see (6) and (7)), this will aﬀect aggregate fertility and female labour force participation
by changing the composition of couples who use or don’t use childcare.
Before turning to the endogenous determination of childcare spending, let us ﬁrst look
at the equilibrium decision on childcare, for given spending. Figure 6 shows the curve
1   F(ˆ β) against the “expected” fraction of families using childcare, He (see Section 5 for
15Fernandez (2007b) and Fogli and Veldkamp (2009) both use learning models to study the evolution
of female labour force participation. In their models, women have some prior belief about the cost of
labour supply, which they update using information from women around them. This amounts to using the
observed female labour force participation in the reference group (assumed to be all women in Fernandez
(2007b) and only a local sample in Fogli and Veldkamp (2009)) to infer the cost of labour supply. Translated
to the current setting, the learning framework implies that couples use aggregate childcare usage to infer
the eﬀect of childcare on their children.








Figure 6: Equilibrium childcare usage
details on the parameter values). Possible equilibria are given by the intersection of this
curve with the 45◦ line. Stable equilibria are shown by the black circles. As can be seen
from the ﬁgure, there is a stable equilibrium with H = 0 and one where H is relatively
large (about 70% in this example). The reasoning is simple. If everyone expects that
others will put their children in childcare, the perceived quality of childcare is high and
actual participation will also be high. Conversely, if couples expect that no one else will
use childcare, the perceived childcare quality is zero and all couples will raise their children
at home. It is this interaction of the perceived quality of childcare and aggregate childcare
usage which leads to multiple equilibria.
4.3 Voting on childcare spending
Let us now look at the determination of childcare spending. Spending is determined by
simple majority voting. Each couple votes for the spending level which maximises its
utility, subject to the government budget constraint
n
∗
Cg = τ ¯ wmH
− (1 + (1   H)(1   ΘN)ℓ
∗
N + H(1   ΘC)ℓ
∗
C)
or, using (6) and (7) and simplifying,
b(1 + (1   ΘC)2)
θC(1   ΘC)
g = τ ¯ wmH
−a
(
1 + (1   H)(1   ΘN)
2 + H(1   ΘC)
2)
(11)








Figure 7: Preferences over taxes to ﬁnance childcare provision
child times the number of children in childcare. This is equal to per capita tax revenue (tax
rate times the labour income of men plus labour income of the 1 H women who raise their
children at home plus that of the H women whose children are in childcare), adjusted for
crowding. The parameter γ 2 [0,1] measures the eﬀect of crowding in childcare spending.
For γ = 0, there is no crowding (pure public good), so each child would receive a service
level which equals total spending. Conversely, if γ = 1, childcare would be a purely private
good so the service level would equal total spending divided by the number of users.16 I
will assume that γ  α, i.e. that the externality from average childcare usage exceeds
the crowding externality. Since perceived quality is proportional to average tax revenue
times H−, this implies that the net externality is positive, so that perceived quality is
nondecreasing in total childcare usage.17
The couple’s problem is thus to maximise maxfVC(),VN()g subject to the budget
constraint (11). I assume that voting is myopic in the sense that when voting, voters treat
childcare usage H as given. Figure 7 shows a typical couple’s indirect utility as a function
of the tax rate, where the budget constraint has already been used in the utility function.
The downward sloping curve VN() is the couple’s utility when children are at home and
the bell-shaped curve VC() is utility when children are in childcare. Hence, the couple
would vote for a zero tax rate if VN()j=0 > max VC(), i.e. if the utility with the children
16It might be preferable to make the crowding factor depend on the children using childcare instead of
families using it, but this would not change the qualitative nature of results. It can also be shown that
the quantitative results would barely change.
17If this were not the case, the median couple would vote for positive taxes only if total usage is small
enough. It can then be shown that an equilibrium might not exist, and if an equilibrium does exist, it will
be unique. See Appendix A.
16staying at home and zero tax rate exceeds the utility with children in childcare and the
couple’s optimal tax rate. Otherwise the optimal tax rate is that which maximises VC().
As can be seen from the ﬁgure, utility is generically non-single peaked. However, in
this simple model, a voting equilibrium nonetheless exists: looking at (8) together with
the government budget constraint (11) shows that the optimal tax rate is identical for all
couples regardless of β, conditional on childcare usage. The only eﬀect of β is that VC()
shifts up so that high β couples will vote for a positive tax rate and low β couples for a zero
tax rate. Hence, utility satisﬁes the single crossing property, and the voting equilibrium is
given by the optimal tax rate and spending level of the couple with the median belief µ.18
The next result characterises the voting equilibrium, for given childcare usage H.
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−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θN ¯ wm(1   ΘN)
1 a
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b (1 + (1   H)(1   ΘN)2 + H(1   ΘC)2)
(13)
Proof. See Appendix B. 
The cutoﬀ ˜ β deﬁnes the value of β where a couple is just indiﬀerent between a zero
tax rate and rearing children at home, and a positive tax rate and sending children to
childcare, for given expected childcare usage He. Equivalently, the median couple would
vote for zero taxes and spending if they expect a level He < ˜ H, where ˜ H is found by
solving (13) for H. When He exceeds this critical level, the median couple’s preferred tax
rate is b
a+b.
Equation (13) shows that the cutoﬀ is proportional to H−. As long as α > γ, i.e. the
net externality of childcare usage is positive, this cutoﬀ falls with H, which means that the
18Note also that the logarithmic utility implies that the optimal tax rate is independent of the wage:
when the wage rises, couples want higher spending since childcare quality is a normal good, but lower taxes
since the tax price of childcare increases with the wage. Given that the income and substitution elasticity
are both one (in absolute value) with Cobb-Douglas utility, this is a wash. Furthermore, VN()j=0 and
max VC() both shift up with wm by the same amount (see (8)) so that in eﬀect the wage is inconsequential
for the voting decision.
17median couple would be more likely to vote for positive childcare provision. Likewise, if
congestion increases relative to the cultural externality (γ   α increases), this cutoﬀ rises,
which would mean that the median couple would need a higher value of H to vote for
positive childcare provision. It is also apparent that ˜ β falls with mean income ¯ wm. When
the tax base increases, the median couple will be more likely to vote for positive childcare.
Moreover, ˜ β is decreasing in θN and ΘN and increasing in ΘC.
4.4 Equilibrium
We can now deﬁne the equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium in childcare provision must satisfy:
(i) The tax rate and level of childcare spending maximise the utility of the household with
median cultural attitude, βM, given the government budget constraint and this household’s
expected level of childcare usage, He,
(ii) all households choose the female’s labour supply and fertility as well as outside or
home childcare to maximise utility, given their private budget constraint, and
(iii) the expected level of childcare usage equals equilibrium usage.
From our previous discussion, the equilibrium is characterised by (12), (11), and (9).
The ﬁrst result is:
Proposition 3 An equilibrium exists.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
We can now characterise the possible equilibria. Here ¯ n and ¯ ℓ are the averages of these
variables in the population.
Proposition 4 (i) If µ < ˜ βjH=1, there is a unique equilibrium with τl = gl = Hl = 0,
¯ nl =
b(1+(1−N)2)
N(1−N) , ¯ ℓl =
a(1−N)2−(1−a)
(1−N) and ωl = ΘN.










and ωh = F(ˆ β)ΘN + (1   F(ˆ β))ΘC.
Proof. See Appendix B. 






Figure 8: Equilibrium childcare usage
This result shows that the existence of multiple equilibria carries over to the case of
endogenously determined policies. Here, the intuition is that when the median couple
expects He = 0, they will vote for zero childcare spending, which obviously makes all
couples prefer to raise their children at home since the quality of external care will be zero.
So this is always an equilibrium. However, when the median couple expects a positive level
of childcare usage, they may vote for a positive level of spending, which yields positive
childcare usage in equilibrium.
Figure 8 shows the determination of equilibrium graphically. The ﬁgure plots the
function ψ(H)  1   F(ˆ β)   H (for particular parameters described in the next section).
As long as the expected childcare usage He falls short of ˜ H, the median couple votes for
g = τ = 0. Then there is a jump in this function at the level ˜ H where the median couple
is just indiﬀerent between VN()j=0 and max VC(). For He  ˜ H, the median couple
starts voting for positive spending. In fact, when He is large enough, in this example
the median couple votes for a level of spending which attracts exactly He families to use
external childcare.
An obvious implication of Proposition 4 is that if the median cultural attitude is low,
there will never be an equilibrium with positive childcare. This equilibrium can only occur
if the median β is large enough, namely larger than ˜ β. The next result derives comparative
statics of the equilibrium with high childcare usage.
Proposition 5 If there is an equilibrium with τh,gh,Hh > 0, Hh, ¯ nh and ¯ ℓh are all in-
creasing and ωh is decreasing in µ; Hh, ¯ nh and ¯ ℓh are decreasing and ωh is increasing in
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Figure 9: Fertility and GDP per capita in OECD countries
decreasing in ΘC.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
The proposition shows how childcare usage, fertility, female labour supply and the wage
gap vary with a society’s observed characteristics. Obviously, the more “pro-childcare” a
society is in the sense of a high median value of β, the larger will be childcare usage, and
hence the larger fertility and female labour supply and the lower the wage gap. These are
also related in intuitive ways to the other parameters: increasing the ﬁxed time costs of
childcare (ΘC) reduces childcare usage whereas increasing the ﬁxed or variable time costs
of raising children at home (ΘC of θC) increases it.
A higher average wage ¯ wm also increases childcare usage. Societies which are richer
on average have a larger tax base, which increases equilibrium childcare spending and
thus leads to higher usage. This prediction seems to be at odds with the observation that
developed countries tend to have lower fertility rates than the less developed ones. However,
Myrskyl¨ a et al. (2009) have recently argued that beyond a certain level of development,
fertility increases with further development (measured by the Human Development Index).
Figure 9 shows that, for the OECD countries the total fertility rate in 2006 is positively
correlated with GDP per capita.
20Table 1: Target values for calibration
Regime Enrolment TFR FLS Wage gap Tax rate
High 0.50 1.93 5.58 0.127 0.015
Low 0 1.37 4.58 0.21 NA
5 Calibration
Benchmark model. The model is now calibrated in the following way. Parameters are
chosen to replicate the total fertility rate, female labour supply, childcare enrolment for chil-
dren under three and gender earnings gap in two stylised regimes: a high-childcare regime
and a low-childcare regime. The high-childcare regime consists of the following countries,
all of which have enrolment rates larger than 40%: Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, France and
Norway. The low childcare regime consists of Germany, Austria and Switzerland, which
had enrolment rates of 13.6% (Germany) and 10.5% (Austria) in 2006.19 The target values
for the calibration are shown in Table 1 (where TFR stands for total fertility rate and FLS
for female labour supply). Given that the low childcare regime in the model necessarily has
zero enrolment, the actual enrolment cannot be targeted in the low childcare regime. The
other values are computed as the unweighted averages of the corresponding values across
the corresponding countries.20
I set ΘN = 0.21, which is the target earnings gap in the low-childcare regime. Using
(7) to solve the target value for female labour supply in the low-childcare equilibrium,
24ℓ∗
N = 4.58 (noting that the time unit is a day), then yields a = 0.709. The targeted tax
rate is τ = b
a+b, which implies b = 0.011. Since the unit of analysis is the couple, fertility in
the low childcare equilibrium is 2n∗
N = 1.37. Using (6), we can solve for θN = 0.032. The
remaining parameters are calibrated to approximate the target values in the high-childcare
equilibrium. In particular, I set ΘC = 0.13,θC = 0.018,µ = 0.0075,σ = 1,α = 1.5, and
γ = 0.9.21 The wage rate is set equal to the average male wage in Germany. Taking the
unit of time to be a day and letting the male hourly wage be 17.8, I set ¯ wm = 430.22 The
19There are no data for children under 3 for Switzerland, but I group it along with Austria and Germany,
since its enrolment rate for children aged 3-6 is 48%, among the lowest of the OECD countries.
20See OECD (2010) for the data. Female labour supply is found by averaging women’s usual working
hours (Table LMF2.1 in the OECD family database) and multiplying by the maternal employment rate
from Table LMF1.2.
21Borge and Rattsø (2008) estimate a population elasticity between  0:69 and  0:79 for per capita
spending on childcare. Older studies have estimated crowding elasticities for local education close to one.
Hence, I take  = 0:9 as a reasonable value for the crowding elasticity.
22According to Krause et al. (2010), this was the hourly male wage in Germany in 2005-2009 (in Euros).





0.191. Couples with children in childcare will have 2n∗
C = 2.47 children and those who care
for their children at home have 2n∗
N = 1.37 children. Women with children in childcare
will work 24ℓ∗
C = 6.76 hours per day and those whose children are not in childcare work
24ℓ∗
N = 4.58 hours per day. The female wage equals 371 Euros per day for women with
children in childcare and 337 Euros per day for those who don’t.
Figure 8 shows the two stable equilibria in the example: one at Hl = 0 and one at
Hh = 0.503 so that 50% of families use childcare. In the high-usage equilibrium, the tax
rate is τh = 0.015 and the service level per capita is g = 11.60. Thus, spending is 1.5% of
income, a little higher than what the high spending OECD countries spent on childcare and
pre-primary education in 2005 (1.2% in Iceland and Denmark). Assuming 200 working days
per year, expenditure would correspond to an annual expenditure of EUR 2491 (adjusting
for congestion). This is above the average of what OECD countries spend on childcare
support, which in 2005 spent 2 549 USD (converted to purchasing power parity) per child
on childcare support (see OECD family database). Taking an exchange rate of 1.25 dollars
per Euro, this corresponds to 2039 Euro. Note, however, that this is only the subsidised
part of total childcare costs. Furthermore, some countries spent much more, for instance,
Sweden spent 5928 USD (4742 EUR) and Denmark spent 6376 USD (5100 EUR). The
interpretation is that countries like Germany or Austria could reach close to Scandinavian
enrolment and childcare provision levels if society were to coordinate on the high-provision
equilibrium.
The calibration results are shown in Table 2. Given the functional forms, we cannot
perfectly replicate female labour supply and the earnings gap in the high-childcare equilib-
rium. Under the chosen parameters, female labour supply exceeds the target value by 1.7%
while the earnings gap is 33% above the target value. Reducing the equilibrium earnings
gap would be possible only at the price of increasing equilibrium female labour supply even
further above the target. Comparing the two equilibria, in the equilibrium with Hl = 0
we have 2¯ n = 1.37,24¯ ℓ = 4.58 and ωl = 0.21. In the equilibrium with Hh = 0.503 we have
2¯ n = 2(F(ˆ β)n∗
N + (1   F(ˆ β))n∗
C) = 1.92,24¯ ℓ = 24(F(ˆ β)ℓ∗
N + (1   F(ˆ β))ℓ∗
C) = 5.68 and
ωh = 0.169. Hence, in the high childcare usage equilibrium, the total fertility rate is about
40% higher and female labour supply 24% higher than in the zero childcare equilibrium.
The wage gap is 19% lower in the high-childcare equilibrium.
22Table 2: Calibration results
Enrolment TFR FLS Wage gap
0 1.37 4.58 21%
50.3% 1.92 5.68 16.9%
∆ – 40% 24%  19%
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis
Enrolment TFR FLS Wage gap
Benchmark 0 1.37 4.58 21%
50.3% 1.92 5.68 16.9%
∆ – 40% 24%  19%
µ = 0.5075 0 1.37 4.58 21%
69.4% 2.13 6.09 15.4%
∆ – 56% 33%  26%
¯ wm = 215 0 1.37 4.58 21%
50.2% 1.92 5.67 16.9%
∆ – 40% 24%  19%
α = 2.25 0 1.37 4.58 21%
50.2% 1.92 5.67 16.9%
∆ – 40% 24%  19%
Sensitivity analysis. Table 3 depicts some sensitivity analyses. Interestingly, most
parameter variations have only minor eﬀects on the equilibrium. For instance, if the
average male wage falls by 100% to 215, there is a small reduction in childcare usage, but
total fertility and female labour supply barely change. Small changes also occur for a 50%
increase of α to 2.25.23 The major exception is a change in the median cultural preference
µ. When this is increased by half a standard deviation to 0.5075, Table 3 shows a marked
increase in childcare usage to 69% (an increase of 38%). Correspondingly, total fertility
and female labour supply increase by about 11% and 7%, while the wage gap falls by 9%.
A change in the time costs of rearing children also has relatively strong eﬀects, but as
Table 4 shows, this change is mostly directly on the fertility and labour supply of those
women rearing their children at home.24 For instance, increasing θN by 25% to 0.04 reduces
fertility of those women to 1.09. This increases the fertility diﬀerential between the high-
23The eﬀect of changing  is not analysed separately, since what matters for the equilibrium is only the
diﬀerence    .
24From Proposition 5, we know that the equilibrium does not change with C, while an increase of ΘC
works like a decrease in ΘN.
23Table 4: Sensitivity analysis (2)
Enrolment TFR FLS Wage gap
Benchmark 0 1.37 4.58 21%
50.3% 1.92 5.68 16.9%
∆ – 40% 24%  19%
θN = 0.04 0 1.09 4.58 21%
50.3% 1.79 5.67 16.9%
∆ – 63% 24%  19%
ΘN = 0.26 0 1.36 2.72 26%
50.3% 1.94 4.92 19.6%
∆ – 39% 61%  25%
childcare and zero-childcare equilibrium, while aggregate childcare usage barely changes.
Likewise, when ΘN increases to 0.26, labour supply of women who care for their children
at home falls to 3.06 hours, while their fertility increases slightly to 1.39. This increases
the diﬀerential in labour supply and the wage gap between the two equilibria, while again
childcare usage changes only by little.
These comparative statics results seem interesting if we were to try to explain the
observed variation in fertility, childcare, female labour supply and the wage gap among
developed nations. Taken at face value, the results would mean that observable diﬀerences
in incomes and exogenous childcare costs cannot explain the large diﬀerences in outcomes
across these nations. Rather, there would seem to be two other possible explanations.
One is that these diﬀerences are due to the fact that diﬀerent countries have coordinated
on diﬀerent equilibria, some on the high-childcare-high fertility and female labour supply
equilibrium and others on the low-childcare-low fertility and female labour supply equilib-
rium. In fact, the model was calibrated so that the low-childcare equilibrium has just the
observed low fertility and female labour supply of countries such as Austria, Switzerland
and Germany, while the high-childcare equilibrium generates the high fertility and high
female labour supply of the Nordic countries and France. Hence, even if the German speak-
ing countries might be no less ‘conservative’ in their inherent preferences than the Nordic
ones, coordination failure may prevent them from achieving the high-childcare equilibrium.
The other potential interpretation is that countries diﬀer in childcare enrolment, fertility,
female labour supply and wage gap because they diﬀer in the cultural attitudes held by
their societies.
24Childcare fees. Up to now, childcare was assumed to be freely available to all. Obvi-
ously, if parents have to pay fees for childcare (as they have to in most countries), the price
of rearing children increases for those who plan to use childcare.
Therefore, in this subsection, I assume that parents have to pay some fees for childcare.
Let p be the (daily) cost of a childcare slot to a couple. This will include childcare fees, net
of direct cash beneﬁts by the governments, tax credits, and other reductions. It is easy to
see that fertility decreases with p but female labour supply rises. The government budget
now has to cover only that part of expenditure not covered by parents’ fees.
In order to simplify the analysis, I assume that all couples earn the same wage wm = ¯ wm,
but the distribution of β remains unchanged.25 All other parameters are the same as in the
benchmark solution. For the childcare fee, a couple in Germany in 2005 would have to pay
on average 124 Euro per month for a child under 3 years, which corresponded to roughly
15% of the cost per slot (Borck and Wrohlich, 2010).26 I use this ﬁgure and assume that
it has to be paid for 4 years, whereas the couple earns wages for 35 years. These numbers
are then discounted using a 3% discount rate and converted to daily ﬁgures. Using these
numbers, fertility of couples who use childcare falls from 2.47 if there were no fees to 2.12
with fees. In fact, as long as the subsidy rate exceeds 28%, in this example fertility would
be higher for those couples who use childcare than for those who don’t.
Likewise, it would be possible to introduce monetary costs of children, such as those
for food, clothing and shelter. These costs would obviously reduce fertility for all families,
regardless of whether they use childcare or not. One study found monthly monetary costs
of 550 EUR in Germany for a family with two children.27 Suppose all other parameters
are unchanged (in particular, the childcare fee remains as described). Assuming that
monetary costs have to be incurred for 20 years, fertility would drop to 0.59 for couples
who use childcare and 0.49 for couples not using childcare.
25The reason is that the optimal tax rate now depends on the wage. This would complicate the deter-
mination of a voting equilibrium. Since this is not the central focus of the analysis, I assume homogeneous
wages in this subsection.
26According to data from the OECD family database, net childcare fees in OECD countries represent
between 0% and 33% of net family income, with an average of 12%.
27See Statistisches Bundesamt, Press release Nr.314 dated 01 August 2006.
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Figure 10: Change in the distribution of cultural attitudes
6 Dynamics
6.1 Inherited attitudes
The purpose of this section is to make the model dynamic. Time is discrete and runs
from t = 0 to inﬁnity. Each period t, a new generation is born. Obviously, these will be
the children of the previous generation. Within each generation, the model proceeds as
described previously. The central assumption is that children inherit their parents’ wage
and their cultural attitude.
The main change is that over time, the distribution of β evolves. In particular, the





 nt 1Ft−1(β) if β  ˆ βt−1
n
C
 nt 1Ft−1(β) if β > ˆ βt−1
(14)
where ¯ nt−1 = Ft−1(ˆ βt−1)n∗
N +(1 Ft−1(ˆ βt−1))n∗
C is the average number of children born in
t   1.
Figure 10 shows how the distribution changes from period 0 to period 1. In period 0,
the distribution is given by the normal distribution F0(β). In period 1, since all couples
with β > ˆ β have more children than those with lower β, the distribution shifts to F1(β).
In our example, the mean value of β shifts from µ = 0.02 in period 0 to a value of 0.2 in
period 1.
In any period, given the period’s distribution of β, the determination of the equilibrium
26remains unchanged. Of course, the equilibrium values change since the distribution has
changed. Note that since the distribution of β changes, the median value of β changes. In
fact, from period t to t+1, the median β increases, if equilibrium childcare usage is positive.
Referring to Figure 8, this implies that the value ˜ H, where the new median couple votes
for positive childcare shifts to the left. The function ψ(H) is, however, independent of the
individual value of β. Since the preferred tax rate is independent of β, the equilibrium value
of H is therefore independent of the median value of β, as long as the median couple votes
for positive childcare provision.28 So the only thing that matters for the determination of
the equilibrium is that from period t to t + 1, the function ψ() shifts according to the
shift of the distribution of β induced by childcare usage and its eﬀect on fertility. The next
proposition describes the result of these changes.
In order to characterise the evolution of the key variables, I shall assume that if –
for historical reasons – we start in period 0 from one of the two stable equilibria, the
equilibrium will remain of the same type in the next period. The next proposition shows
the resulting evolution.
Proposition 6 (i) Starting from an equilibrium with τ0 = g0 = H0 = 0, the equilibrium
will be τt = gt = Ht = 0 and ¯ nt = n∗
N, ¯ ℓt = ℓ∗
N,ωt = ωN for every period t = 1,...,1.
(ii) Starting from an equilibrium with τ0 = b
a+b,g0,H0 > 0, as t ! 1, we get
limt→∞ Ht = 1,limt→∞ ¯ nt = n∗
C,limt→∞ ¯ ℓt = ℓ∗
C and limt→∞ ωt = ωC.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
The intuition is simple. Part (i) says that starting from a zero childcare equilibrium,
there is no possibility for evolution of the endogenous variables as long as the exogenous
parameters remain unchanged, since childcare provision and usage will remain zero for
every period. If, however, we start from an equilibrium with positive childcare provision,
in the long run all couples will use childcare. Correspondingly, female labour supply and
fertility reach their maximum value and the wage gap its minimum. This follows from the
fact that the distribution Ft+1(β) puts more weight on high-β couples than Ft(β). Hence,
equilibrium childcare provision and usage must be higher in t + 1 than in t.
Note that, strictly speaking, this is only a limit result. Couples with β  0 will never
use childcare, and since they reproduce, childcare usage will always be below 100%. In the
28Since below we will start from an equilibrium where the median couple votes for Hh > 0 in period 0,
it is easy to see that this will hold true in every period.
27limit, however, childcare usage converges to one as time goes to inﬁnity and the proportion
of families not in childcare goes to zero.
Figure 11 shows how the key endogenous variables evolve over time, using the bench-
mark parameters from the example in the last section. Here, ¯ β denotes the average cultural
attitude parameter. Note that within 5 generations, this increases by more than a factor
5.
6.2 Learning
I now brieﬂy explore the role of learning in the model. Fernandez (2007a) and Fogli and
Veldkamp (2009) both study the eﬀect of culture on female labour force participation in
learning models. They assume that women use information about the eﬀects of labour
supply using samples of other women around them. This learning process gives rise to
slowly evolving female labour force participation.
In this subsection, I assume that couples learn about the eﬀects of childcare by observing
the fraction of children who are in external childcare. A simple way of modeling this is
that a couple’s attitude towards childcare is governed by
βt = λβt−1 + (1   λ)Ht−1 (15)
With λ = 1 this corresponds to perfect inheritance of values, while λ = 0 would be the
opposite, which would imply that society’s values converge immediately.29
When the economy is at an equilibrium with Hl = 0, learning obviously cannot take
place since there is no one to learn from.30 However, when the equilibrium in period t
has positive childcare usage, individual and aggregate beliefs evolve over time. Figure 12
displays the evolution of childcare usage and female labour supply over time, comparing
the case without learning (λ = 1, shown by the light curves) with the learning case, where
λ = 0.25 (shown by the dark curves). It is apparent that learning speeds up the evolution of
childcare usage and female labour supply, but the learning process slows down very quickly.
Hence, female labour supply levels oﬀ when childcare usage is getting high. This resembles
29Hiller (2009) makes a similar assumption.
30Kimura and Yasui (2009) study a model with endogenous fertility and publicly provided education,
where families can top up public education with privately bought education. Using this approach here,
there could be learning even with zero public childcare spending, if some families used private childcare
and couples would observe the fraction of families doing so.











































Figure 11: Evolution of equilibrium values over time

















Figure 12: Evolution of equilibrium values with learning
the S-shaped evolution of female labour force participation generated in Fernandez (2007a).
7 Conclusion
This paper has examined the role of cultural attitudes for the provision of childcare, fertility,
female labour supply and the gender wage gap. In particular, the simple assumption that
perceived childcare quality depends on cultural attitudes and on aggregate childcare usage
leads to multiple equilibria, where equilibria with zero childcare provision, low fertility
and female labour supply and high wage gap exist alongside equilibria with high childcare
provision, high fertility and female labour supply and low wage gap. This observation could
potentially explain the large variation in these variables observed among some otherwise
similar countries such as the OECD countries.
The paper has also presented some descriptive evidence which is consistent with these
theoretical results. Clearly, it would be desirable to explore whether these correlations are
causal. However, since cultural attitudes and childcare policies are endogenously deter-
mined, this would necessitate some plausible exogenous variation in cultural values.
What are the implications of the model for policy makers? One obvious remark is that
increased childcare provision may not aﬀect fertility or female labour supply if a society’s
attitude towards external childcare remains unchanged. However, while this outcome may
seem bleak to politicians, the link between attitudes and policies also opens up a channel
for inﬂuencing fertility and female labour force participation. In particular, if politicians
could somehow aﬀect society’s expectations, they might induce a country to switch from a
low-childcare equilibrium to a high-childcare equilibrium. Whether and how such policies






Figure A.1: Non-existence of equilibrium with γ > α
could work remains to be shown.
Appendix
A The case when α < γ
When α < γ, ˜ β is increasing in H. This implies that the median couple will vote for
positive taxes and spending only if H is low enough, because then crowding is dominated
by the externality in beliefs. Hence, the function ψ(H) may look as shown in Figure A.1:
to the left of ˜ H, the median couple votes for positive taxes and spending and H is positive;
then at ˜ H there is a downward jump. In this case, as can be seen from the ﬁgure, an
equilibrium does not exist.
If an equilibrium exists – if the value of ψ(H) just to the right of the jump is positive
– then it will be unique (since ψ(H) is downward sloping and ψ(1) < 0).
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (8) utility can be rewritten as
VJ() = K + alog(1   τ) + log(1 + (1   ΘJ)
2)   (1   a)log(1   ΘJ)   blogθJ
+ 1b(logβ + logg + logH
)
(A.1)
31where K is a constant depending on a,b and wm. Substituting from (11) and simplifying
gives:
VC() = K + log(1 + (1   ΘC)
2)   (1   a)log(1   ΘC)   blogθC





b(1 + (1   ΘC)2 ((1   H)(1   ΘN) + H(1   ΘC))
] (A.2)
Maximising (A.2) with respect to τ gives τ∗ = b
a+b. Inserting into (A.2) shows that the
couple will vote for τ = 0 if VN()j=0 > max VC() and τ = b
a+b otherwise, where
max
 VC() = K + log(1 + (1   ΘC)












b(1 + (1   ΘC)2 ((1   H)(1   ΘN) + H(1   ΘC))
]
(A.3)
VN()j=0 = K + log(1 + (1   ΘN)
2)   (1   a)log(1   ΘN)   blogθN (A.4)
Solving VN()j=0 = max VC() for β gives ˜ β in (13). 
Proof of Proposition 3. It suﬃces to show that τ = g = 0 is always an equilibrium
for α > γ. From Proposition 2, the median couple will vote for τ = g = 0 if H < ˜ H(βM),
where ˜ H is implicitly deﬁned by βM = ˜ β(H). Given g = 0, no one will choose childcare
so H = 0. Hence, if the median couple expects He = 0, the equilibrium is given by
τ = g = H = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Diﬀerentiating ˜ β in (13) shows that
d~ 
dH < 0 since α > γ,
and limH→0 ˜ β = 1. Hence, if µ < ˜ βjH=1, the median couple will vote for zero taxes and
spending whatever her expected He, and hence, in equilibrium τ = g = H = 0.
(ii) Since
d~ 
dH < 0, µ > ˜ βjH=1 implies that there is an expected level of childcare usage
where the median couple votes for τh = b
a+b and a positive spending level. Call this level
of childcare usage ˜ H. For H < ˜ H, ψ(H) =  H, which implies that H = 0 is a locally
stable equilibrium. At H = ˜ H, there is a jump in ψ(H). If ψ( ˜ H) < 0, the equilibrium
with H = 0 is unique. Suppose that ψ( ˜ H) > 0. It can be shown numerically that over
the relevant parameter range, ψ(1) < 0. By continuity of ψ(H), the intermediate value
32theorem implies that there is at least one other equilibrium with Hh > 0 where ψ(H) = 0,
and since ψ′(H) < 0, this is the only other equilibrium. 





























where ϕ() is the pdf of the standard normal distribution. Since nh and ℓh are increasing





ˆ β   µ
σ2 ϕ
(








= sign(ˆ β µ). The other results follow from diﬀerentiating ˆ β and noting that
d (•)
d^  =  ϕ() < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) Given that Ht = 0 implies ˆ βt = 1, the distribution does
not change from period t to t+1, since no one uses childcare and fertility equals n∗
N for all
β. Hence, Ft+1(β) = Ft(β) for all t. Therefore, the equilibrium is given by τt = gt = Ht = 0
for all t.
(ii) We ﬁrst show that the distribution Ft(β) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates Ft−1(β)
(which is apparent from Figure 10). Let A 
nN
 nt 1 and B 
nC




AFt−1(β) for β  ˆ βt−1
AFt−1(ˆ βt−1) + B(Ft−1(β)   Ft−1(ˆ βt−1)) for β > ˆ βt−1
(A.7)




AFt−1(β) for β  ˆ βt−1
Ft−1(β) + (1   B)(1   Ft−1(β)) for β > ˆ βt−1
(A.8)
Since A < 1 < B, it follows that Ft(β) < Ft−1(β) for all β. This implies that ψt(H) =
1   Ft(β)   Ht > ψt−1(H) = 1   Ft−1(β)   Ht−1 for all t. Since the equilibrium is locally
stable at Ht, it follows that Ht > Ht−1. 
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